The epistemological limitations of scientific inquiry: Crucial experiments revisited
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Abstract
Scientific knowledge is the outcome of research and experimentation. How this goal is to be achieved is and has been a topic of much debate over the centuries. In the 17th century, the English philosopher and scientist Francis Bacon (1561-1626) regarded science as the systematic collecting and gathering of facts. Upon this view, nature tells us what the facts are on the assumption that we learn how to listen properly to nature. We design experiments and run them, and the verdict is to nature. Thus, “crucial” experimentation is the hallmark of science. A crucial experiment is an experiment that unambiguously favours one or the other of two competing hypotheses under test, no matter the outcome. At some stage in the development of science, it was believed that such crucial experiments can be designed. However, some philosophers deny that they are possible in some domains of scientific inquiry, while others deny that they are possible in any domain of scientific inquiry. In this context, the French physicist, historian and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) argued that in physics, crucial experiments are not possible. While the American philosopher W. V. Quine (1908-2000) adopted the radical view that crucial experiments are forthcoming in no domain of scientific inquiry. In the philosophy of science, these two views are joined in what came to be known the Quine-Duhem Thesis. This study examines the controversial Quine-Duhem Thesis and discusses whether, or not, it is considered a threat to the rationality of science. The fundamental features of rationality in science are to be addressed. It is concluded that the Quine-Duhem thesis does not make an epistemological point and Quinean holism does not destroy the objectivity of science.
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